Regulating the Medical Profession: From Club Governance to Stakeholder Regulation by Marty, Chamberlain
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in :
Sociology Compass
                                    
   





Chamberlain, J. (2010).  Regulating the Medical Profession: From Club Governance to Stakeholder Regulation.












This article is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the
terms of the repository licence. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to publisher restrictions or conditions.
When uploading content they are required to comply with their publisher agreement and the SHERPA RoMEO
database to judge whether or not it is copyright safe to add this version of the paper to this repository. 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ 





The 2008 Health and Social Care Act introduced reforms in the regulation of the 
medical profession in the United Kingdom which have arguably challenged medical 
autonomy in the form of the principle of medical self-regulation through introducing 
performance surveillance and appraisal mechanisms designed to ensure medical 
practitioners are ‘fit to practice’ in their chosen speciality. This paper outlines these 
developments, arguing as it does so that there has been a shift in the governance of 
medical work from the traditional ‘club governance’ model toward one based upon 
‘stakeholder regulation’. The consequences of this state of affairs are discussed and 
possible research avenues highlighted in light of the proposed introduction in 2011 of 
the performance appraisal process known as revalidation.    
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 This paper is concerned with recent developments in the regulation of the 
medical profession in the United Kingdom. It outlines changes to the General Medical 
Council (GMC) and in the surveillance and performance management of medical 
work brought about by the 2008 Health and Social Care Act. In doing so it highlights 
an important new research avenue for sociologists interested in the regulation of 
professional forms of expertise. It is divided into three sections. In the first the paper 
discusses the 1858 Medical Act and the traditional ‘club governance’ model of 
medical regulation. It then explores the 2008 Health and Social Care Act and the 
contemporary shift toward ‘stakeholder regulation’. The paper concludes by arguing 
for the need for social scientists to conduct research into the introduction of the 
performance appraisal tool known as revalidation.  
 
The 1858 Medical Act and Club Government 
 
‘In 1858 the GMC was effectively a gentlemen’s club. Its promise that the public 
could trust those it registered amounted to ensuring that there were no ‘bounders’ in 
the medical fraternity [sic] who would do dastardly things such as no gentleman 
would do…’.  
Stacey (1992: 204)  
 
The medical profession in the United Kingdom is regulated by the GMC. The 
GMC was founded by the 1858 Medical Act which granted the profession control 
over entry onto and exit from a legally underwritten register of state approved medical 
practitioners. The GMC’s two key responsibilities are to maintain a register of 
qualified medical practitioners and to define the nature of the qualifications necessary 
to obtain registration. It is commonly argued that medicine’s altruistic principles and 
close association with science naturally led to its being granted the privilege of 
professional self-regulation (i.e. Irvine 2003). However the GMC did not come into 
existence within in a socio-economic and political vacuum. Indeed both Stacey (1992) 
and Moran (1999, 2004) have been at pains to point out that broader social 
circumstance shaped the nature of the institutional arrangements surrounding the 
establishment of the GMC. The 1858 Medical Act may well have been designed to 
regulate the burgeoning health care marketplace and to generate public trust in the 
competence of medical practitioners. But both it and the GMC it gave rise to were 
nevertheless reflections of the essentially pre-democratic, oligarchic, political 
structure of the time (Gladstone 2000). As Moran (2004: 28) notes ‘because 
government was the product of an era of oligarchy, deference and social elitism it 
was the government of clubs…[and] the government of doctors was patterned on the 
club system’. He cites Marquand (1988: 178) who says of the ideology of the broader 
Victorian governing style that ‘[the] atmosphere of British government was that of a 
club, whose members trusted each other to observe the spirit of the club rules, the 
notion that the principles underlying the rules should be clearly defined and publicly 
proclaimed was profoundly alien’.  
 
In line with the club governance model medical elites such as the royal 
colleges and medical schools exclusively controlled the GMC, and so access to and 
from the state register of approved practitioners, and in doing so protected medical 
autonomy in the form of the principle of professional self-regulation from outside 
surveillance and control. Medicine’s lack of transparency and accountability arguably 
continued for the next hundred and fifty years until the 2008 Health and Social Care 
Act (Chamberlain 2010). However in response to a series of high profile cases - such 
as the general practitioner and mass murderer Dr Harold Shipman who killed over 
two hundred and fifteen of his patients – in the last decade the state intervened and 
sought to ‘open up’ medical regulation and make it more transparent and publicly 
accountable (Davies 2004). Indeed as the paper will now discuss on the surface it 
appears that the 2008 Health and Social Care Act has significantly reduced the 
stranglehold medical elites have traditionally possessed over the GMC. 
 
Stakeholder Regulation and the 2008 Health and Social Care Medical Act 
 
It would be misleading to say that medical control over the GMC went 
completely unchecked. Particularly as rapid social and economic changes from the 
1960s onward increasingly brought about the questioning of traditional forms of 
authority (Moran 2004). Certainly a series of high profile medical malpractice cases 
reinforced that greater inter-professional cooperation and managerial and lay 
involvement in the regulation of professional expertise was urgently needed 
(Gladstone 2000). For example, the Royal Bristol Infirmary case saw several children 
die due to botched procedures which the surgeons involved tried to cover up. Cases 
such as Bristol reinforced to medical elites such as the royal colleges that they needed 
to adopt more open and transparent governing regimes which included all the 
stakeholders involved (Davies 2004, Irvine 2006). They established clear standards 
which could be operationalized into performance outcomes against which the ‘fitness 
to practice’ of members of the profession could be regularly checked (Black 2002, 
Irvine 2003). The rise of stakeholder regulation was bound up with the emergence of 
a ‘new medical professionalism’ (Irvine 2006). As the chairman of the GMC of the 
time, Donald Irvine, noted (2001: 1808), ‘the essence of the new professionalism is 
clear professional standards’.  
 
These reforms did not go far enough for many victims of medical malpractice. 
Yet it was not strictly a medical malpractice case, but rather an instance of a 
doctor possessing criminal intent, which can be said to have engendered 
fundamental change in the governance of medical expertise (Chamberlain 2000). 
The general public was morally outraged by the case of Harold Shipman, the 
general practitioner from Hyde in Manchester who was able to use his position 
to murder two hundred and fifteen of his patients, and furthermore, seemed to 
have enjoyed the protection of the GMC. That is at least initially when his case 
first came into the public eye (Stacey 2000). Many an impartial onlooker, let 
alone the relatives of Shipman’s victims, was repulsed by the fact that it was not 
until well after his conviction that the GMC finally struck Shipman off the 
medical register and admitted that a decade earlier he had in fact come before its 
fitness to practice panel for prescription abuse (Gladstone 2000).  
 
Undoubtedly the Shipman case played a pivotal role in reinforcing the 
need to end medical control of the GMC (Chamberlain 2010). Indeed Smith 
(2005: 1174) at the end her governmental review of the Shipman case, was ‘driven to 
the conclusion that, for the majority of GMC members, the old culture of protecting 
the interests of doctors lingers on’. She noted that “it seems….that one of the 
fundamental problems facing the GMC is the perception, shared by many doctors, 
that it is supposed to be ‘representing’ them. It is not, it is regulating them….In fact 
the medical profession has a very effective representative body in the BMA, it does 
not need – and should not have – two” (Smith 2005: 1176). In 2007 the Health and 
Social Care White Paper was announced as a direct result of the Smith’s 2005 report. 
This passed through parliament as the 2008 Health and Social Care Act. The 2008 Act 
introduced two key reforms in medical regulation. First, non-medical ‘lay members’ 
now have to make up half of the GMC membership, while all new members are 
elected via an independent system overseen by the Public Appointments Commission. 
Furthermore the GMC lost its power to adjudicate on fitness-to-practice cases. 
Traditionally such cases have been judged on the criminal standard - beyond all 
reasonable doubt. A situation which has frequently led commentators to argue the 
GMC’s disciplinary procedures have first and foremost protected underperforming 
doctors instead of members of the general public (i.e. Allsop 2006). But now fitness 
to practice cases are to be judged on the civil standard of proof - on the balance of 
probability – which it is hoped will enable underperforming doctors to be more easily 
stopped from continuing to practice. 
 
The second key part of the 2008 Act was the introduction of what is to be 
known as a ‘GMC affiliate’ within National Health Service (NHS) accountability 
structures at a local level. The affiliate will coordinate the investigation of complaints 
at a NHS trust level. The affiliate will also work with the royal colleges concerning 
the arrangements for ensuring every doctor is ‘fit to practice’ in their chosen specialty. 
Known as revalidation, this process consists of two elements - relicensing and 
specialist recertification (Donaldson 2006). Doctors currently have to undergo an 
annual check of their performance, known as annual appraisal, as part of their NHS 
employment contract (Black 2002). Smith (2005: 1048) felt that as it currently 
operates appraisal would not have identified Shipman and does ‘not offer the public 
protection from underperforming doctors’. Appraisal still occurs annually but there 
will be greater direct testing of a doctor’s competence in regards to the completion of 
key day-to-day work tasks. All doctors will now have to pass the relicensing 
requirement that they have successfully complete five annual appraisals in order to 
stay on the medical register (The Secretary of State for Health 2007). Specialist 
recertification is new and like recertification will occur every five years. It will 
involve a thorough ‘hands on’ assessment of a doctor, by the relevant royal college, of 
their ‘fitness to practice’ in their chosen medical specialty (Donaldson 2008). It is 
expected that a mixture of clinical audit, direct observation, simulated tests, 
knowledge tests, patient feedback and continuing professional development activates, 
will together ensure specialist recertification (Donaldson 2008). Relicensing and 
specialist recertification elements of the revalidation process were initially planned to 
be introduced by 2010, but there has been a slight delay and revalidation will now be 
formally introduced nationally from mid-2011 onwards.  
 
Expert Systems and the Service Ideal 
 
‘Expert systems bracket time and space through deploying modes of technical 
knowledge which have validity independent of the practitioners and clients who make 
use of them. Such systems penetrate virtually all aspects of social life in conditions of 
modernity – in respect to the food we eat, the medicines we take the building we 
inhabit, the forms of transport we use…..[but they] depend in an essential way on 
trust’. 
Giddens (1990: 18) 
 
There can be no doubt that over the last three decades there has been a cultural 
and organisational shift within the health and social care context toward emphasising 
professional accountability (Davies 2004).  Indeed medical elites themselves argue 
that the emergence of stakeholder regulation signifies a ‘cultural change’ towards a 
more transparent and contractually binding regulatory relationship between medicine 
and the public (i.e. Irvine 1997 2003, Catto 2006 2007). Yet contemporary 
developments  are often criticised in a somewhat knee jerk fashion by ‘rank and file’ 
health care professionals as providing prescriptive procedures and rules in the form of 
protocols and guidelines to be blindly followed without question (Chamberlain 2009). 
There is a feeling of disquiet within the medical profession with what is ultimately 
seen to be a politically motivated and unrealistic tendency on behalf of government to 
minimise clinical risk by turning medical work into a series of routine ‘step by step’ 
rules and procedures against which individual clinician performance can be measured 
(Harrison 2004). Because for many this fails to recognise the importance of the tacit 
and personal dimensions of medical expertise and the inherent risks present in messy 
‘real world’ clinical practice situations. Certainly many medical practitioners would 
argue that these situations are decidedly different from the sanitised world assumed by 
clinical guidelines and protocols. It is no wonder therefore that regardless of their 
views about how it should be undertaken and by whom, many if not all doctors claim 
that some form of professionally led medical regulation is both necessary and in the 
public interest.  
 
Eliot Freidson has repeatedly highlighted over an academic career spanning 
four decades that the need for doctors to exercise discretion in their work is an issue 
which is unlikely to disappear as long as people need and want to see a doctor to help 
them cope with illness and disease (Freidson 1970 1994 2001).  Indeed in his latest 
work Freidson (2001) has moved away from his earlier more critical view of medical 
autonomy (i.e. Freidson 1970). He insists that doctors must be allowed to exercise 
discretion in their work due to its inherently specialist nature, the tacit-indeterminate 
foundations of medical expertise, as well as the emphasis medicine collectively places 
upon providing a community service through promoting public health. He holds that 
non-medical external regulation of medical work is not always possible or in the 
public interest. He outlines three methods of regulatory control – ‘Bureaucracy’, 
characterised by managerial control, ‘The Market’, characterised by consumer 
control, and ‘Professionalism’, characterised by occupational self-control (Freidson 
2001). He discusses how in the last two decades greater managerially led 
‘Bureaucracy’ and a concurrent increase in the rule of ‘The Market’ have successfully 
challenged ‘Professionalism’, with the doctors increasingly losing the right to exercise 
discretion in their practice. In particular he notes that patients are unwilling to adopt 
the subservient position medicine has historically accorded them. Patients nowadays 
frequently see themselves as active health care consumers. Additionally there has 
been a rise in managerial control over clinical practice through the increased use of 
standardised administrative procedures, in the form of clinical guidelines and 
protocols. These exist under the banner of supporting greater patient choice while also 
improving productivity. Freidson (2001: 181) argues that ‘the emphasis on 
consumerism and managerialism has legitimised and advanced the individual pursuit 
of material self-interest....the very [vice] for which professions have been criticised’.  
In summary, while previously an ardent critic of the high level of autonomy granted 
to medicine to control its own affairs, Freidson (2001) now emphasises the positive 
moral role professions such as medicine can and do play in society. Like Stacey (1992 
2000) before him he holds that the moral code of public service inherent in the 
concept of professionalism can act to dispel what Wilson (1990: 147) called ‘the 
ethical vacuum of the ‘postmodern’ society’. He argues that health practitioners 
themselves, not patients and managers, must ultimately control their work activities. 
Not least of all because the nature of their knowledge demands that society 
recognises professionals must possess ‘independence of judgement and freedom of 
action’ (Freidson 2001: 122). Although he recognises that this may not be to 
everybody’s taste, he calls for a revival of the ‘ideology of service’ and claims that 
professional monopolies are ‘more than modes of exploitation or domination they are 
also social devices for supporting growth and refinement of disciplines and the 
quality of their practice’ (Freidson 2001: 203).  
 
Sociologists like Stacey (1991 2000) and Freidson (1994 2001) echo the 
common view amongst professionals that it is not the principle of professional self-
regulation that in itself is unjustifiable. It is only particular instances where it has been 
abused. Professionals must now work with the public to make sure such abuses do not 
happen again (Irvine 2003 2006). The emergence of stakeholder regulation and the 
advocacy by medical elites of a ‘new professionalism’ is an attempt to establish a new 
contractual relationship between the medical profession and the public against the 
background of increasing government intervention into the field of medical regulation 
(Slater 2007). Recent moves to change in the field of professional regulation 
reinforce that effective medical regulation, similar to the effective delivery of 
health care, requires the cooperation and proactive involvement of individual 
medical practitioners and their elite institutions. This is because contemporary 
challenges to professional autonomy bring to the foreground the fact that the principle 
of medical self-regulation was first institutionalised in the form of the GMC as it 
provided a workable solution to the complex problem of ‘how to [both] nurture and 
control occupations with complex, esoteric knowledge and skill…which provide us 
with critical personal services’ (Freidson 2001: 220).  
 
Conclusion: Researching Revalidation 
 
It is the dynamic nature of this need to both nurture and control professional 
expertise which has led to the royal colleges and medical schools being allocated a 
significant role in developing and implementing new performance appraisal tools such 
as revalidation. It is also why medical control over entry onto (via medical school and 
junior doctor training) and exit from (via appraisal of their continue competence) the 
legally underwritten state approved register of practitioners will continue for the 
foreseeable future. Not least of all because the state does not want the GMC to be 
completely abolished. It is, after all, a self-funding body paid for by doctors 
themselves. While peer assessment is still acknowledged, by both medical and non-
medical observers alike, as the essential core method by which an individual doctor’s 
clinical competence can be legitimately assessed and underperformance addressed 
(Irvine 2003, Catto 2006 2007, GMC 2008). Indeed the Health and Social Care Act 
2008 may well propose managerial, patient and inter-professional involvement in 
revalidation when it is finally implemented at a national level in 2011. Yet the 
revalidation process will nevertheless be organized and quality assured by the royal 
college relevant to a particular medical speciality, operating in tandem with the GMC 
and NHS management (Chamberlain 2009).  
 
The Health and Social Care Act of 2008 did however put into place significant 
checks and balances to medical control over doctors activities. As this paper has 
already noted, the GMC will be made up of an equal number of lay and medical 
members, all of whom will be independently nominated by the Public Appointments 
Commission. While in spite of medical elite campaigning, the burden of proof 
required in fitness to practice cases has been lessened from criminal standards – i.e. 
beyond all reasonable doubt – i.e. to civil standards - on the balance of probability. 
Consequently the current ‘state of the field’ surrounding medical regulation appears 
significantly different to what it was a decade or so ago, let alone one hundred and 
fifty years ago when the GMC was first established. The GMC is more open and 
publicly accountable than it ever has been (Allsop 2006). Yet the issue of the 
specialist nature of professional expertise, alongside the concurrent need for 
professionals to exercise discretion in their work, does create a ‘buffer zone’ that 
protects doctors from outsider surveillance and control (Freidson 2001). Freidson 
(1994) argued via his restratification thesis that medical elites were increasingly 
exploiting this buffer zone as they sought to maintain some semblance of medical 
autonomy through subjecting ‘the rank and file doctor’ to greater surveillance 
and control mechanisms. Revalidation is arguably the latest example of this 
approach (Chamberlain 2010). There will no return to the ‘closed shop’ era of club 
governance. Indeed medical elites must now increasingly advocate a transparent and 
inclusive governing regime under the ever-watchful eye of the state.  Nevertheless 
doctors still possess significant amount of freedom to control their own affairs, 
particularly when compared to other occupations. The current situation concerning the 
governance of medical expertise is therefore perhaps best summed up by Moran 
(1999) who argues that: ‘…states are more important than ever before, either in the 
direct surveillance of the profession or in supervising the institutions of 
surveillance…[this] has not necessarily diminished the power of doctors; but it has 
profoundly changed the institutional landscape upon which they have to operate’ 
(Moran 1999: 129-30).  
In conclusion given the events discussed in this paper it clearly important for 
social scientists to engage in a dedicated longitudinal research programme concerned 
with the implementation of new regulatory quality assurance tools such as 
revalidation. Not least of all because the limited empirical research which currently 
does exist concerning similar performance monitoring and appraisal mechanisms to 
revalidation, such as annual NHS appraisal for example, reinforces that there is a 
tendency for doctors to engage in paperwork compliance toward regulatory tools 
designed to survey and quality control their performance in an open and transparent 
manner, due in no small part to the inherent tensions that exist between the formal and 
tacit foundations of medical expertise (see Chamberlain 2009 for greater detail). 
Clearly this is a research area within which social scientists could use their own 
expertise to help medical elites strike a balance between protecting medical autonomy 
and ensuring medical work remains open to a necessary element of surveillance and 
control in order to protect the general public from poorly performing doctors. After all 
medicine is not the only profession that possesses a strong public service ideal. 
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